On God, Suffering, and Theodical Individualism by Gellman, Jerome
187
ON GOD, SUFFERING, 
AND THEODICAL INDIVIDUALISM
JEROME GELLMAN
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Recently, Stephen Maitzen has provided an argument for the non-
existence of God based on ordinary morality. Here is Maitzen’s argu-
ment, abbreviated down to the relevant parts for my reply and slightly 
reformulated for ease of presentation:
 
 (1) Necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary, human suf-
fering only if such suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for 
the suff erer. (Maitzen calls this “TI”) 
 (2) If God exists, then necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary hu-
man suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer. 
(From 1)
 (3) If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suff ering ul-
timately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer, then we never 
have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary hu-
man suff ering.
 (4)  We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, 
involuntary human suff ering.
 (5)  So, it isn’t the case that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary 
human suff ering ultimately produces a net benefi t for the suf-
ferer. (From 3 and 4)
 (6) So: God does not exist. (From 2 and 5)
I will assume the truth of (1), and thus of (2) which follows from (1). 
My problem is with (3). Maitzen must do much more to show that (3) is 
true, or even very plausible. My argument is that (a) the set of proposi-
tions I am about to list is not implausible, granting God’s existence and 
perfect goodness and a proper understanding of ordinary morality, and 
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(b) since that is so, the consequent of (3) does not plausibly follow from 
(3)’s antecedent. 
Let P be any person that I allow to endure suff ering, instead of pre-
venting the suff ering. And let S be the particular instance of suff ering 
that P undergoes. And consider the following set of fi ve propositions, the 
fi rst four of which are about God and the fi ft h a moral principle: 
 (G1) God has so created the world that God is able to produce for P 
a degree, D, of good for P that will make P’s existence worth-
while.
 (G2) God will bring about D for P. Th is will not be in the form of 
compensation but a result produced by P’s history.
 (G3) D is a maximal degree of good that God can produce for P.
 (G4) God will bring about D for P whether P suff ers (this particular) 
S or not. If P suff ers S, then God will produce a net good from S 
for P, to off set the evil of S in order to reach D. 
 (G5) One can morally allow P to suff er S, if and only if the net benefi t 
to P from allowing S will far outweigh S, and either: (a) the net 
benefi t to P from allowing S will be far greater than the good 
that will be P’s if one prevents S, or (b) the net benefi t to P from 
one’s allowing S will not be less than the good that will be P’s if 
one prevents S, and allowing S will signifi cantly increase the net 
good in the world. 
I now explain each of the members of (G1)-(G5):
(G1) and (G2) are consequences of theodical individualism, accord-
ing to which God must see to it that each person’s life be worthwhile, and 
not just that the existence of the world at large be worthwhile. I include 
in P’s existence P’s life aft er death. I envision the degree of good that is 
P’s in the aft erlife as produced by earlier events and not as compensation. 
I also do not disallow a view like John Hick’s wherein we continue to 
grow and change in the aft erlife with new degrees of goodness accruing 
to our existence. 
(G3) follows from God’s supreme goodness. Th ere will be constraints 
upon what the maximal degree of goodness is that God can produce for 
P. For example, God will want the best distribution of good overall in 
the world and will want a world that is good overall. So, given such con-
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straints, God will produce the best possible degree of good for P. P will 
have no claims against God that God did not produce a higher degree of 
good for her, because her existence is the best it could be without fulfi ll-
ing her selfi sh desires to get more for herself on other peoples’ accounts. 
(G4) refl ects the fact that God is so damned smart that God has been 
able to create the world so that whether P suff ers S or not, P will receive 
D. And it refl ects God’s goodness, in that God would not allow S to occur 
if it were to detract from the ultimate net result, D, for P. 
(G5) makes a claim about our ordinary morality. It says that while 
consequentialist reckoning is relevant to the allowing of undeserved, 
involuntary, human suff ering, the morality of allowing such suff ering 
is not purely consequentialist. Th at is because we have a moral deonto-
logical obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary, human suff ering 
(when able, when appropriately situated, etc.). And while that obligation 
is defeasible, it is not overridden by a mere net benefi t for the suff erer.
What is needed to defeat the deontological obligation not to allow 
suff ering is that either: (a) the net benefi t far outweighs the suff ering and 
far outweighs what good would accrue to the suff erer without that suf-
fering; or (b) the net benefi t that far outweighs the suff ering is at least the 
same as what good would accrue to the suff erer without that suff ering, 
and produces a signifi cant net increase of good in the world. Th ese are 
necessary and suffi  cient conditions for one being allowed not to prevent 
undeserved, involuntary, human suff ering. 
On alternative (a), the benefi t justifying one’s not preventing the suf-
fering is all P’s. On alternative (b), however, the benefi t that justifi es not 
preventing the suff ering is not P’s but others’. Th is can happen in at least 
two ways. Th e fi rst is that one might be able to bring a very high benefi t 
to another person by allowing P to suff er. And the second is that in adju-
dicating one’s moral obligations to others as well as to P it turns out that 
one’s obligations to others are stronger than, and so defeat, one’s obliga-
tion to prevent P from enduring S. 
You might protest that (b) violates Maitzen’s Kantian stricture, let’s 
call it “K.”
 (K) Nobody (including God) can treat human beings merely as 
a means. 
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Th e violation appears to occur because (G5) permits us (and God) to 
allow P to suff er in order to benefi t others. 
However, (G5) does not violate (K), on Maitzen’s interpretation of 
it, which I accept. For Maitzen, (K) prohibits “sacrifi cing an innocent 
person who did not ask for it” (p. 116, my emphasis), and (K) prohibits, 
“exploiting” a person by visiting upon them undeserved, involuntary, hu-
man suff ering (p. 117). However, (G5) licenses none of these. Remember, 
whenever (G5) allows the non-prevention of undeserved, involuntary, 
human suff ering the suff erer is either better off  or at least as well off  as 
she would have been without having endured that suff ering. Th e only 
thing that has happened is that the deontological moral obligation that 
others have not to allow P to endure undeserved, involuntary, suff ering 
has been overridden by either a justifi ed benefi t to P or to others. Th is 
does not constitute a “sacrifi ce” or “exploitation” of P in any way, and 
should not be forbidden by (K). To put it tersely, (G5) does not excuse 
any instance in which a person treats P merely as a means. 
It is not implausible to assume that the set (G1)-(G5) is true, granting 
God’s existence and perfect goodness and our understanding of ordinary 
morality. But, then the antecedent of (3):
 (3a) Necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suff ering ulti-
mately produces a net benefi t for the suff erer.
does not plausibly imply (3)’s consequent:
 (3c) We never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, invol-
untary human suff ering.
Th at my allowing P’s undeserved, involuntary suff ering will result in 
a net benefi t for P is, by (G5), not suffi  cient reason for me to not have 
a moral obligation to prevent P’s suff ering. More is necessary. So, (3) is 
not plausible. Even if all involuntary human suff ering ultimately were to 
produce a net benefi t for the suff erer, there would still be instances in 
which I had a moral obligation to prevent it. Such would be an instance, 
for example, where the benefi t to the suff erer is only slightly more than 
preventing the suff ering would yield. 
Moreover, according to (G1)-(G4), it will never be the case that we may 
allow an instance of undeserved, involuntary suff ering on the grounds 
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that it will produce a far greater benefi t for the person than would pre-
venting the suff ering. And that is because in every instance, according 
to (G1)-(G4), God will in any case bring about the maximum possible 
degree of good for the person during his existence – whether he endures 
that particular suff ering or not. So the clause (a) of (G5) will never apply 
to any of us when faced with the opportunity to prevent suff ering. For 
my money, theodical individualism should entail that we always have 
an obligation to prevent a case of suff ering in P, unless the conditions of 
(G5) are met. In practice, this means that in the great majority of situa-
tions, my theodical individualism will obligate preventing suff ering. In 
any case, since (G1)-(G5) is not implausible, (3) is not yet plausible. 
Well, now, you ask, what justifi es God allowing undeserved, invol-
untary suff ering? Aft er all, (G5) obligates God no less than it does mere 
mortals. And since God is a perfect being God will faithfully fulfi ll the 
dictate of (G5).
On (G1)-(G4), it follows that the suff ering God allows a person to 
endure is such that God allows it either: (i) so as to produce for that per-
son a degree of good that is maximal for that person and also satisfi es the 
conditions of (G5), or: (ii) because allowing it follows from God’s jug-
gling of God’s obligations to all human persons. Since God is the creator 
of all persons and sustains them in life at every moment, all human be-
ings stand before God with an equal claim on God to produce for them 
a maximal possible ultimate benefi t in their existence. All human beings 
are turned to God with an equal claim to a personal maximal net benefi t, 
everything else being equal. Th us, God’s obligations to others besides P 
are of vastly greater dimensions than that of any human being to other 
persons. Th at is at least one reason why God might be justifi ed in al-
lowing suff ering in the world, in vastly many cases, while humans have 
relatively sparse permission to do so. I have already argued that in light 
of (G1)-(G5) such thinking does not violate the above Kantian stricture 
about using people as mere means. 
One might be skeptical as to whether the world we live in is one where 
the God of (G1)-(G4) exists. One might doubt, for example, whether 
every person receives an ultimate benefi t that makes his or her exist-
ence worthwhile. Such doubts belong to the problem of evil and must 
be discussed on their own. Th ey do not relate to the present argument 
against God’s existence from theodical individualism. Th at argument, 
I have tried to show, fails to convince.
